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Managing Successive Generation Product Diffusion in the Presence of 
Strategic Consumers 
Abstract 
Frequent new product release and technological uncertainty about the release time pose 
significant challenges for firms to manage successive generation of products. On the one hand, 
strategic consumers may delay their purchase decision and substitute the earlier generation with 
the newer generation product. On the other hand, the firm must fully anticipate consumer 
reactions and take into account the effect of their strategic behavior on product pricing and 
successive generation product diffusion. This paper proposes a prediction market to forecast 
new product release. We show that the market information aggregation mechanism can improve 
forecast accuracy of new product launch. Better forecasting increases consumer surplus, firm 
revenue, and social welfare. 
1. Introduction  
Technology advances significantly speed up new product development, resulting in several 
generations of the same product coexist in the consumer market. The most familiar examples 
include Apple's iPod and iPhone family of products and Microsoft Windows and Offices lines of 
products. Newer models and versions are continuing to emerge. As the time interval between 
new product release decreases, it is important to understand the impact of new technologies on 
earlier ones. 
The new generation technology gives consumers a better product that they value more. When 
new technologies become available, it provides an opportunity for potential adopters of earlier 
technologies to substitute the more recent technologies for earlier ones. In anticipation of price 
reductions, consumers may choose to wait for the sale. This is termed as inter-temporal 
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substitution by customers, which diminishes the potential sales of the earlier technologies. 
Ignoring such strategic behaviors from consumers will lead to the firm’s sub-optimal pricing 
decisions.  
On the other hand, the adoption of new products follows a diffusion process in a social-
technological system. Even if the substitution is under way, earlier technologies will continue to 
diffuse through the population. Both substitution and diffusion need to be understood when 
assessing and forecasting the influence of new technologies on earlier ones. 
Clearly, understanding consumers’ decisions about which product to buy and when to buy 
and how consumers behave in the technology market deserves careful attention. However, there 
are several challenges when managing successive generation product diffusion. First, due to the 
fear of possible cannibalization of sales for the first generation product, firms usually do not have 
incentive to disclose their new product release information. Because of such strategic concern, 
even if firms are willing to reveal such information, firms' signals may be perceived as 
incredible. Strategic communication of information such as cheap talk is impossible. In addition, 
there exists technological uncertainty about the release time, as it largely depends on project 
success in new product development. Therefore, the true probability of new product release at 
certain time is unknown.  
To solve this information sharing dilemma, we propose a market system to predict the new 
product launch. Prediction markets are very useful for estimating the market's expectation of 
uncertain events. The best known prediction market is the Iowa Electronic Market. Various 
forms of prediction markets show the power of markets to provide information about probability 
of future events. A number of successes in these markets, both with regard to public events like 
presidential elections and within firms, have generated substantial interest in designing markets 
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that leverage distributed knowledge of participants. 
Today, the technology savvy consumers are well informed about the technology potential 
from many channels. They form expectations about price decrease, new product release, as well 
as new capabilities of the next generation product. We design a prediction market specifically for 
revealing and aggregating product release information. The final payoff structure of the trading 
contract provides incentive for truthful information revelation.  Price fluctuation reflects ongoing 
development of news and information about the new product release. 
Building upon basic insights from the seminal Bass product diffusion model (Bass 1969), 
Norton and Bass multi-generation model (Norton and Bass 1987), we describe diffusion 
dynamics across successive generation of products. Our model assumes that each generation has 
its own market potential and market penetration process. Potential adopters of earlier generations 
can shift to newer generations through substitution. In contrast to most existing literature that 
treats consumer demand as an exogenous arrival process. We model demand dependencies that 
arise due to substitution effects across the two generations of products. By fully anticipating 
strategic consumers’ response, we examine how firms should design their selling mechanisms in 
order to maximize expected profits. 
2. Model Assumptions and Strategic Consumers  
We assume the firm sells two generations of the product. The first generation of the product is 
introduced at    , and the second generation is introduced at      . This model setup is 
motivated by Apple's iPhone release. Following the announcement of iPhone4 in June 2010, the 
3GS is only available in an 8GB version and the iPhone 3G was officially discontinued. 
Therefore, a two-generation model in the product market is sufficient. 
We assume the first generation product is priced at   before the second generation product is 
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available; when the second generation product is introduced, the second generation is priced at   
and the first generation is sold at a discounted price    . This pricing strategy is frequently 
observed in the high tech product market. For example, Apple’s first generation iPad was 
introduced on April 3, 2010. Its entry model iPad with Wi-Fi 16GB model was priced at $499. 
When the second generation iPad2 is introduced, the new Wi-Fi 16GB model is sold at the same 
price as its first generation. The first generation model price dropped to $399.  
2.1. Before the Introduction of the Second Generation Product (When    )  
Because the second generation product availability depends on the new product debelopment 
project success, consumers face uncertainty about product availability. In the following, we 
analyze the consumer’s wait-or-buy decision in terms of individual utilities. 
We assume that a consumer derives heterogeneous utility         by consuming the first 
generation product, where   is a random variable drawn from a uniform distribution [0,1]. We 
further assume that the consumer enjoys a higher utility    , where    , for the second 
generation product due to enhanced functionalities, better quality, and so on.  
At time    , if a consumer chooses to wait for the second generation product, the consumer 
incurs a waiting cost       , where   is the per unit waiting cost. Linear waiting cost has been 
extensively used in queuing theory, where   is interpreted as waiting-cost rate (per unit time 
waiting cost) and the waiting-cost function is linear in the expected waiting time. Mendelson and 
Whang (1990) used a similar linear delay cost function. Since we use linear waiting cost to 
model the decay of consumer utility, our parameter   models the degree of patience. 
If a consumer decides to buy the first generation product at time  , the consumer obtains a net 
utility of    . If the consumer decides to wait for the second generation product, then 
depending on the true probability of project success, she can obtain the product with probability 
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 . If she is able to buy the second generation product, she obtains net utility            ; 
otherwise, she would buy the first generation product with a net utility           .  
Therefore, a potential consumer at time   has expected utility                
                 . That is,                   . Accordingly, we have the 
following result about consumers' wait-or-buy decision. 
Lemma 1: There exist thresholds     
      
 
 ,      
       
 
, and    
      
      
, such that 
      and  
a) all affordable consumers would purchase the first generation product if    ; 
b) consumers whose utility     would buy the first generation product and those utility 
    would wait for the second generation product; 
c) all affordable consumer would wait for the second generation product if    . 
Note that 
  
  
  
 
      
  . If a consumer with valuation   would prefer to wait for the 
second generation product at time  , then all consumers with valuation   and above also prefer to 
wait for the second generation product at time     .  
Moreover, 
  
  
  
      
       
  . It shows the connection between consumers’ behavior and 
the probability of project success  . The probability of new product development project success 
is similar to the concept of fill rate in the literature. The higher is the fill rate, the less risky is the 
stockout. Similarly, higher probability of project success will lower the threshold   and more 
consumers would like to wait for the second generation product.  
We assume that, at any moment, the demand for the entire market is the total shopping 
intensity of individual consumers. Based on the definition of Levin et al. (2005), the shopping 
intensity is proportional to the probability that the valuation exceeds the current product price. 
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We are able to derive the following market segmentation. 
Proposition 1: Before the introduction of the second generation product, the proportion of 
strategic consumers who would buy the first generation product is: 
 
      
      
      
        
    
 ; 
The proportion of strategic consumers who would wait for the second generation product is: 
 
    
  
      
      
     
       
 . 
2.2. After the Introduction of the Second Generation Product (When    )  
If the second generation product is introduced, the newer generation product brings higher 
consumer surplus, i.e.,         . Consumers would prefer the newer model. With the 
price cut, consumers will choose the model that brings her higher surplus. The indifference 
consumer’s utility can be calculated as:    
 
   
. Therefore, we have the following result. 
Lemma 2: When    , there is a threshold valuation    
 
   
 such that the strategic consumer 
whose valuation       would prefer to buy the second generation product and whose valuation 
     would still prefer to buy the first generation product at the discounted price. 
Proposition 2: After the second generation product is introduced,   
 
   
 proportion of 
strategic consumers would substitute for the second generation product, 
  
   
   proportion of 
strategic consumers would still prefer the first generation product. 
We see that the market segmentation is time invariant. As   increases, the proportion of 
strategic consumers who prefer the first generation product increases.  
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We see that, before the introduction of the second generation product, the total proportion of 
consumers who can afford the product when     is    . When        , the proportion of 
consumers who choose between immediate purchase of the first generation product and waiting 
for the second generation product is time dependent. As   increases, more consumers would like 
to wait for the second generation product. 
After the introduction of the second generation product, the total proportion of consumers 
who can afford the product increases by  . So the total proportion of consumers who can afford 
the product when     is      . 
Figures 1 and 2 in the Appendix compare the market segmentation with and without the 
introduction of the second generation product. We see that, in the demand model, consumer 
purchase probability changes over time. Clearly the proportion of consumers who are interested 
in buying the first generation product is a stepwise linear decreasing function of time. As shown, 
strategic consumers’ purchase strategy is a time dependent threshold policy. 
3. Market Game and Information Disclosure  
In May 2010, Wal-Mart dropped the price of iPhone 3GS with 16 gigabytes of storage space 
with a two-year contract with AT&T from $197 to $97. That’s a sign Apple was getting ready to 
unveil a new model. However, Apple declined to comment on whether it’s planning to release a 
new iPhone soon, or whether it will also sell the iPhone 3GS for less. Apparently, Apple does not 
have an incentive to share its product release information. In this section, we describe the market 
game and discuss incentives for information disclosure. 
3.1. Market Game 
In our market game, the seller acts as a Stackelberg leader announcing his contingent and fixed-
discount pricing strategy. Consumers take the seller's strategy as given and determine their 
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purchasing behavior. We identify a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and show that given the 
seller's strategy, the equilibrium in the consumer subgame is unique and consists of time 
dependent threshold purchasing policies. 
We assume that no consumers possess perfect market information, but consumers observe 
signals about the likelihood of new product introduction. Let subscript       represent 
scenarios where a consumer receives a good signal, bad signal, and the aggregated market signal.  
We have the following result: 
Proposition 3:  There exists a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium for the game under no information 
sharing, where strategic consumers would buy the first generation product when       and wait 
for the second generation product when       , where 
     
                
 
 , where        . 
When there is no information disclosure, individual consumers would purely rely on the time 
to make decision. At any time  , if the customer’s utility from buying is strictly greater than her 
utility from waiting, the customer would buy the first generation product. Otherwise, the 
customer would wait. 
The seller’s equilibrium pricing strategy           will depend on the state       , which in 
turn, is determined by   and  . The Bayesian Nash Equilibrium requires that both the firm and 
the customers do not have any unilateral profitable deviation from the strategy profile which 
defines the equilibrium. Specifically, the first condition requires that, when fixing the strategy of 
the strategic consumers and the firm, the strategic consumer should not have any profitable 
deviation. The second condition requires that, given the strategic consumers’ best response 
actions, the firm maximizes its profit by using the announced strategy. A Bayesian Nash 
Equilibrium is a babbling equilibrium if the customer’s actions in equilibrium do not depend on 
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the information provided by the firm. The following result shows that it is impossible for the 
firm to credibly communicate any information to customers. 
Proposition 4:  The strategic consumers’ purchase decision is independent of the firm’s signal of 
project success. 
Therefore, the action of the strategic consumers taken in equilibrium is independent of what 
the firm announces, due to the lack of credibility of such an announcement. The overall 
purchasing probability is unaffected by the messages provided by the firm. In the following 
section, we discuss the information structure and propose a prediction market model to credibly 
predict the new product development project success. 
3.2. Information Structure   
We assume that, although the product firm may have better knowledge than consumers about the 
likelihood of project success, the true probability of new product release is   
 
 
, which is an 
unknown parameter due to technology uncertainty. Many factors may affect the new product 
development success. Technology savvy consumers may obtain either good signals (denoted as 
   ) or bad signals (denoted as    ). For example, information that a key supplier has 
developed a new chip model can be viewed as a good signal, and recent failure of a related 
project by the same product firm is perceived as a bad signal. We assume            
 
 
. 
That is, a consumer is more likely to receive a good (bad) signal since the firm’s true success rate 
is greater than 1/2. Accordingly,             . In addition, we assume the prior belief 
about the firm’s new product release is        . 
Consumers who receive different individual signals would update their beliefs differently. 
The expressions are as follows: 
         
  
             
;           
      
             
. 
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We propose a prediction market in which a binary contract is traded. The contract pays off $1 
if the second generation product is introduced at time  , and it pays off $0 if the second 
generation product is not introduced at time  . 
We assume the number of consumers who receive signals is proportional to the total 
cumulative sales of the first generation product. That is, as the time for new product release 
approaches, more signals about the new product development are available. Therefore, we 
assume consumers receive signals following a binomial distribution with parameters          , 
where     representing the proportion of consumer population who care about or who are 
interested in collecting signals.      is the cumulative sales of the first generation product up to 
time  . So the expected number of consumers who have received     is             and 
the total number of consumers who have received     is                . As a result, 
the market price for this binary contract is expressed in the following Proposition. 
Proposition 5:  If consumers who receive independent signals trade in the prediction market, the 
market price at time t is the predicted probability of new product release: 
                     
               
                                   
; 
Moreover,          
                  . 
It shows that the proposed market mechanism can effectively collect and aggregate the 
signals dispersed among individual consumers. At any time, the market price can be interpreted 
as the probability of the new product release. When the time approaches the scheduled release 
time, the market predicted probability is very close to the true probability of project success. The 
predictive error is bounded by an error term  , which depends on the consumer interest of 
collecting and trading signals as well as the total market penetration of the first generation 
product at time  . 
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4. Two Generation Product Diffusion Model with Strategic Consumers 
Let m1 be the market potential for the first generation and m2 be the potential uniquely served by 
the second generation. It can be considered as an incremental market for newer generation.      
is the probability of adoption at time  .      is the fraction of the ultimate potential adopters by 
time  . It is the probability of purchase given that the consumer has not purchase the product by  . 
Assume     portion of the consumer population is non-strategic consumers who would 
purchase the first generation product without considering the possibility of the better, second 
generation product.  
We assume linear demand function. At any time  , the total market demand is      
       
    
  
 . Here     is the proportion of affordable consumers,  
    
  
 is the proportion of 
population that has already adopted the product, and the term in the bracket is the probability of 
purchase from remaining consumers.  Assume       , the initial market potential is      
       . This is the maximum market size for the first generation product if it is priced at  .  
Under decentralized information scenario, consumers individually observe private signals. If 
the second generation product is indeed introduced, the instantaneous sales for the first 
generation product can be expressed as: 
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
    
  
      
    
  
     
        
    
  
        
      
      
           
    
  
        
        
    
  
         
    
  
       
        
    
  
  
  
   
   
    
  
    
  
Note that the first three equations of the demand dynamics are based on Proposition 1 and the 
fourth equation is based on Proposition 2. Otherwise,  
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 . 
Based on insights from the multi-generation model of Norton and Bass (1987), the 
instantaneous sales for the second generation product when     can be expressed as: 
               
      
  
      
      
  
          
    
  
    
 
   
 
    
  
 . 
At    , we have: 
     =          
      
      
 
  
  
        
    
  
               
 
  
        
    
  
    
This is the demand that from strategic consumers who have decided to wait for the second 
generation product rather than purchasing the first generation product. This is the substitution 
effect. 
With the prediction market, the cumulative sales for the first generation product can be 
expressed as: 
   
     
 
 
 
 
         
    
  
      
    
  
     
        
    
  
         
    
  
       
        
    
  
  
  
   
   
    
  
      
      
  
    
 . 
            
      
  
         
      
  
          
    
  
    
 
   
 
    
  
 . 
At    , we have      =            
 
  
        
    
  
   . 
With the prediction market, when        , some optimistic consumers who receive good 
signals will adjust their belief so that they will not delay their purchase to the second generation. 
This helps the seller to realize sales early rather than late. When        , some pessimistic 
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consumers who receive bad signals will adjust their belief so that they can wait for the second 
generation of the product. This helps increase the consumer surplus because consumers value the 
second generation product more than the first generation product. As long as consumers can 
afford the waiting cost, those consumers would better off if they wait and the second generation 
product is indeed introduced. 
5. Numerical Illustration 
In his section, we use a numerical example to show the impact of strategic consumer behavior on 
pricing policies and expected revenue. Assume that the firm uses a markdown pricing 
mechanism. At the beginning, the firm announces the schedule of prices      . The first 
generation product is priced at   . If the second generation product is successfully introduced at  , 
the second generation product is priced at   and the first generation product is sold at discounted 
price    . If the second generation product is failed to market, the first generation product is 
still priced at  . In the numerical example, we take m1=1000, m2=500,     , T=10,   5. 
Recall that    represents the portion of non-strategic consumers in the population. When 
   , all consumers are strategic and they may practice inter-temporal substitution. When 
   ,  all consumers are myopic and they would make a one-time purchase decision at the time 
of arrival. Figure 3 in the Appendix shows the sub-optimality gap on the portion of strategic 
consumers under different information structure. When all consumers in the population are non-
strategic, the information structure does not matter for the seller’s revenue. Under the 
decentralized information structure, even if the seller takes into account strategic consumers’ 
behavior, the revenue is only 62% of that without strategic consumers. The presence of strategic 
consumers reduces the seller’s revenue. Moreover, if the seller incorrectly assumes that strategic 
consumers are myopic in their purchasing decisions, it can be quite costly, leading to 32% 
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decrease of potential revenue under decentralized information sharing. However, market-based 
information aggregation can improve the firm’s performance. 
Recall that when the per unit waiting cost c is high, consumers are less patient. Figure 4 
shows the optimal pricing under different degree of patience of strategic consumers. We see that, 
with strategic consumers, the firm needs to set a lower selling price for the product. Intuitively, 
this will discourage strategic consumers from waiting. The selling price is lower when the 
strategic consumers are less patient. This gives impatient consumers incentives to buy early. As a 
result, when the second generation product is available, the seller is able to heavily discount the 
first generation because the channel cannibalization effect is not too severe, and major purpose 
of discounting is to pick the remaining market potential.  
In contrast, when strategic consumers are relatively patient, the seller would prefer a 
relatively high selling price for the product and set a smaller discount for the first generation 
product when the second generation is available. This is primarily because the seller cannot 
effectively induce strategic consumers to purchase the product early. The lower price discount 
when the second generation is available is a strategy to prevent channel cannibalization. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows the importance of taking into account strategic consumers’ purchase behavior 
when managing successive generation product diffusion. Because firms cannot credibly share 
product information with consumers, we propose a prediction market to achieve effective 
information aggregation. Our numerical example demonstrates that more effective information 
sharing can improve firm performance. Moreover, we find that if firms fail to account for 
strategic consumer behavior and overlook the demand dependency due to product substitution, 
the loss of revenue can be substantial. Optimal pricing decision should trade off such demand 
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dependency between the two generations of products. Our numerical study suggests the first 
should take a different pricing strategy in the presence of  strategic consumers.  
There are a couple of limitations for this study. First, we do not consider capacity rationing. 
That is, the firm does not manipulate product availability to influence consumers’ timing of 
purchase. Second, although we consider consumer learning effects, we do not incorporate 
valuation uncertainty in our model. Finally, although our focus in this study is to understand the 
diffusion dynamics across generations, future work may examine optimal market entry timing 
for product line extensions or new product generations.  
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Appendix 
 
Figure 1: Market Segmentation if Second Generation Product Introduction is Successful 
 
Figure 2: Market Segmentation if Second Generation Product Introduction is Unsuccessful 
B1: immediate buy the first generation product 
S1: strategic wait and desire to buy the first generation product at discounted price (market 
expansion) 
S2: strategic wait and desire to buy the second generation product (substitution)  
L1: immediate purchase the first generation product at discounted price (market expansion) 
L2: immediate purchase the second generation product (substitution)  
N: unaffordable for both generations of products 
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Figure 3: Sub-Optimality Gap under Different Information Structure and the Seller’s 
Consideration of Strategic Consumer 
 
Figure 4: Price and Discount when Strategic Consumers are More or Less Patient under Market-
Based Information Aggregation 
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